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) 
[So F. No. 21035. In Bank. Oct. 4, 1962.] 
MARY HELEN MACHADO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
JOHN R. MACHADO, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Husband and Wife - Community and Separate Property-
Profits of Business.-The part of the profits of a separate. prop-
erty enterprise attributable to the husband's efforts are com-
munity property, whether the enterprise be classified as 
"commercial" or "agricultural." 
[2] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
-The net income derived from the husband's devotion, during 
the marriage, of all his working time and energy to farming 
and dairy operations on his separately owned real property 
should have becn apportioned in the divorce de.cree between 
the husband's separate property and the community property. 
Unless expenditures for family living expenses exceeded the 
amount apportioned to the community property,community 
funds were. used for some of the payments for real and per-
sonal property purchased by the husband, thus giving the 
community an interest in one or more of the items found to 
be the husband's separate property. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Determination of Character of Property-Evidence.-
The presumption of joint tenancy arising from the fact that the 
deed to the spouses' home was put in joint tenancy was not 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22; Am.Jm., 
Community Property (1st ed § 32). 
McE.. Dig. References: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 58; [3, 4] 
Husband and Wife, § 92; [5] Building and Loan Associations, § 3; 
[6,7] Husband and Wife, § 93; [8] Divorce, §§ 219,220; [9,10] 
Divorce, § 219; [11] Divorce, § 297; [12,13] Divorce, § 242. 
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overcome where, though the hUt;band testified· that he did not 
intend to givc Ids wife nn interest in the home, there was no 
evidence of a comlllon unde.rstnllding or agreement between the 
spouses that the property was to be held by them in other than 
joint tenancy. 
ld.-Determination of Character of Property-Evidence.-AI-
though a joint tennncy <leed is not eonclusive as to the char-
acter of real property, it creates a rebuttable presumption 
that it is held in joint tenancy, and such presumption cannot 
be overcome by testimony of the hidden intentions of one of the 
parties, but only by evidence tending to prove a common under-
standing or an agreement that the character of the property 
was to be other than joint tenancy. 
Building and Loan Associations-Members-Joint Tenants.-
The langunge of Fin. Code, § 7602, providing that when sbares 
or investment certificates of a building and loan association 
are issued in the name of two or more persons as joint tenants 
or in form to be pnid to any of them or the survivors of them, 
such shares or certificates and all dues paid thereon become 
the property of such persons as joint tenants, creates a rebut-
table presumption of joint tenancy that may be overcome by 
proof that the owner of the funds, wheu making the deposit, 
did not intend to create a true joint teu!lncy. 
Husband and Wife-Determination of Character of Property-
Questions of Fact.-Whether the presumption arising under 
Fin. Code, § 7602, that a joint savings and loan association ac-
count was held in joint tennncy was overcome was a question 
of fact. 
ld.-Determination of Character of Property-Judgment.-
Whe.re the husband withdrew all the money from the spouses' 
joint savings and loan account without his wife's consent im-
mediately after the parties separated, transferring part of the 
funds to a new account established in his and another person's 
name and receiving a check for tbe remainder of the funds as 
to the disposition of which he offered no evidence, the trial 
court sbould have provided in the judgment of divorce that the 
husband account for half the llmount of the joint account at 
the time it was closed. 
Divorce-Disposition of Property-Separate Property.-In a 
divorce action, the court does not have authority to award any 
of the s~arate propcrty of one spouse to the other, nor can 
it award the wife exclusive possession of real property owned 
by the spouses as joint tenants, except as provided in Civ. 
Code, § 157, relnting to temporary exclusion of either spouse 
from the family dwelliug or from the dwelling of the other 
until final determination of the action. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 288,293. 
) 
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[9] ld. - Disposition of Property - Exclusion of Spause From 
Dwelling.-The purpose of Civ. Code, § 157, authorizing the 
court in di,orce proccedings to mnkc orde.rs for the temporary 
exclusion of either spouse from the family dwelling or from 
the dwclling of the other until the final detel'mination of the 
action, is to protect the spouse's right to the exclusive occu-
pancy of his or her or the family dwelling pending final de-
termination of the nction. 
[10] ld..-Disposition of Property-Family Dwelling.-In a divorce 
proceeding, it was error for the court to award the wife 
not simply the exclusive right to occupy the family dwelling, 
held by the spouses in joint tenancy, but also the exclusive 
right to use it in any way she might see fit, especially where 
such order was not limited in time to the final determination of 
the action. 
[11] ld.-Support of Children-Amount of Award.-Defendant 
husband had the ability to pay a child support award of $75 
per month for cach of the couple's two minor children where 
the husband's total income for the last five ye.ars of the mar-
riage averaged nbout $300 per month after payment of federal 
income tax(>!':, and he owned assets of substantial value. 
[12a, 12b] ld.-Restraining Orders.-An injunction that had been 
issued in a divorce case enjoining the husband from "molest-
ing" and "annoying" the wife was not rendered void for vague-
ness and uncertainty by use of the quoted words where the 
husband on several occasions made unfounded accusations 
that the wife had committed adultery and used abusive lan-
guage in her presence, where he twice parkcd his truck within 
sight of the family home and a strange man came from the 
truck to the front door of the house and asked the wife if a 
"sporting girl" was there, and where the husband sometimes 
locked the wife out of the house lute at night so that once she 
was required to have a policeman help her gain entry. 
[13] ld.-Restraining Orders.-The language of an injunction in a 
divorce case enjoining the husband from "molesting" and 
"annoying" the wife must be interpreted in the light of the 
record which discloses the type of conduct enjoined. 
APPEALS from parts of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Merced County. R. R. Sischo, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action for divorce. Parts of judgment awarding alimony 
and child support, determining character of certain property 
and enjoining defendant from molesting or annoying plaintiff, 
affirmed; remainder of portion of jQdgment appealed from 
reversed. 
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Kane & Canelo and Thomas J. Kane, Jr., for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Natalie J. Holly for Defendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court entered an interlocutory de-
cree of divorce in favor of Mary Machado on the ground of 
extreme cruelty and refused to grant a divorce to defendant 
and cross-complainant John Machado. The court determined 
the character of various items of property, and awarded plain-
tiff alimony, custody of the two minor children, $75 per month 
for each child as support and maintenance, and exclusive pos-
session of the joint tenancy family residence property until 
further order of the court. The court also enjoined defendant 
from molesting, annoying, or striking plaintiff. No appeal 
was taken from the interlocutory decree of divorce, but both 
parties appeal from other parts of the judgment. 
Property Rights 
The parties were married in June 1950 and separated in 
March 1959. At the time of the marriage plaintiff owned no 
separate property. Defendant had title to three parcels of 
ranch land (40, 38 and 2 acres respectively), various items of 
farming equipment, cattle, an automobile, and a $40,000 sav-
ings account. Although he paid for the 40-acre and the 
2-acre parcels before the marriage, he had paid only $3,000 
of the $12,000 purchase price on the 38-acre parcel. It is con-
ceded that after the marriage he paid $1,700 on this parcel 
with his separate funds. 
During the marriage defendant devoted all of his working 
time and energy to farming and dairy operations on the three 
parcels and on another 40-acre parcel leased from his father. 
All income during the marriage was derived from these opera-
tions, except interest on the spouses' $8,500 joint savings and 
loan account and defendant's $40,000 account. The proceeds 
of the farm ,nd dairy were deposited in a single commercial 
bank account. All expenditures were made from this account, 
including payments for the balance due on the 38-acre parcel 
($7,300) and for the family residence property, household 
furniture, a 1959 Oldsmobile, farming and dairy equipment, 
and cattle. 
The trial court determined that the parties owned no com-
munity property, that they owned as joint tenants the family 
residence and the $8,500 savings account, and that defendant 
owned as his separate property the three parcels of ranch 
( let. 1062 J MACHADO V. MACHADO 
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land, all farming equipment, tractors and cattle, the 1959 
Oldsmobile, the household furniture, and thc $40,000 savings 
account. In doing so the court relied 011 Estate of Pepper, 
158 Cal. 619, 623·624 [112 P. 62, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 1092], and 
held that the agricultural income of defendant's separate prop-
erty and the property purchased with this income was en-
tirely his separate property. [1] In Estate of Neilson, 57 
Cal.2d 733, 741 [22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745], we overruled 
the Pepper ease and held that the part of the profits of a 
separate property enterprise attributable to the husband's 
efforts are community property, whether the enterprise be 
classified as "commercial" or "agricultural." 
[2] The spouses' federal income tax returns indicate that 
from the date of the marriage until the end of 1959 the net 
income of the enterprise after federal income taxes averaged 
approximately $170 per month.1 This income should have 
been apportioned between defendant's separate property and 
the community property. Unless expenditures for family liv-
ing expenses exceeded the amount apportioned to the com-
munity propcrty,2 community funds were used for some of 
the payments for real and personal property, thus giving the 
community an interest in one or more of the items found to 
be d~fendant 's separate property. 
Plaintiff and defendant challenge the findings that the 
family residence and the $8,500 savings and loan association 
accou.nt are joint tenancy property. Both parties maintain 
that they did not intend to create joint tenancies and that 
the home and savings account have the same character as their 
source, i.e., the receipts from the farming and dairy enter-
prise.a 
[Sa] Each party testified that when the family residence 
was purchased they did not instruct the bank handling the 
transaction to put the deed in joint tenancy. Plaintiff testified 
that she went to the bank and signed papers when defendant 
told her to do so. Defendant testified that he signed papers 
at the bank at a different time, that he did not see plaintiff's 
• 
'This figure includes the full amount of capital gains realized from the 
sale of cattle and excludes interest payments on the two savings accounts. 
"No evidence of family living expenses was introduced at the trial. 
"Plaintiff contends that these receipts were entirely community prop-
erty because they represent defendant's earnings during the marriage; 
defendant contends that t.hey were entirely separate property on the 
authority of Estate of Pepper, supra. To the extent that these receipts 
were profits of the enterprise, neither contention can be Bustained. 
(Estate of Nei~cm, npra.) 
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name on the deed, and that he did not intend to give her an 
interest in the house. 
[ 4] Although a joint tenancy (Ieed is not conclusive as 
to the character of real property, it creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that it is held in joint tcnancy. The presumption 
created by the ueed cannot be overcome by testimony of the 
l)idden intentions of one of the parties, bnt only by evidence 
tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement 
that the character of the property was to be other than joint 
tenancy. [ 3 b] Sincc there was no evidence of a common 
understanding or an agreement the presumption was not 
overcome. (Gtldelj v. G-udelj, 41 Ca1.2d 202, 212-213 [259 P. 
2d 656]; Bocol v. King, 36 Ca1.2d 342, 345-346 [223 P.2d 
627] .) 
Similar principles apply to the joint savings and loan ac-
count. Financial Code section 7602 provides: "When shares 
or investment certificates are issucd in the name of two or more 
persons whethcr minor or adult as joint tenants or in form to 
be paid to any of them or the surviyors of them, such shares 
or certificates and all dues paid thereon become the property 
of such persons as joint tenants."· [5] In Paterson v. 
Comastri,39 Ca1.2d 66, 71 [244 P.2d 902], we held that similar 
language applying to joint bank accounts now contained in 
Financial Code section 852 created a rebuttable presumption 
of joint tenancy that may be overcome by proof that the 
owner of the funds, when making the deposit, did not intend 
to create a true joint tenauey-. This holding applies also to 
section 7602. (See Pruyn v. Waterman, 172 Cal.App.2d 133, 
136-137 [342 P.2d 87].) [6] Whethcr the presumption was 
overcome was a question of fact for the trial court. (Gttdelj V. 
Gudelj, supra; Paterson V. Comastri, SUP"Q, 3!) Cal.2d at p. 73.) 
[7] Defendant withdrew all the money from the joint ac-
count without plaintiff's consent immediately after the parties 
separated. He had the savings and loan association transfer 
$3,500 to a ne,v account established in his and another person's 
llame and received a check for the remainder of the funds. He 
offered no evidence as to the disposition of· these funds. The 
trial court t~refore should have provided in the judgment 
in accordance with its memorandum opinion that defendant ac-
'This section did not become operative until 1953. At the time the 
spouses' account was opened in 1952, it was controlled by almost exactly 
the same language contained in Building and Loan Association Act, 
~ 8.04, Stats. 1931, ch. 269, p. 514, as amended by State. 1951, eh. 451, 
p. 1472. 
Oct. 1962] MACHADO v. MACHADO 
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count for half the amount of thc plu·til.'s' joint account at the 
time that account was closed. 
Defendant contends, and plaintiff concedes, that the trial 
court had no jurisdiction to award plaintiff the exclusive use 
and possession of the family residence until further order of 
the court. 
[ 8 ] In a divorce action the court does not have the au-
thority to award any of the separate property of one spouse 
to the other. (Fox v. Fox, 18 Ca1.2d 645, 646 [117 P.2d 325].) 
Neither can it award the wife exclusive possession of real 
property owned by the spous<'s as joint tenants. (Carter v. 
Carter, 148 Cal.App.2d 845, 848-849 [307 P.2d 630] ; Jenlcins 
v. Jcn7cins. 110 Cal.App.2d 663. 665 [243 r.2d 79] ; Barba v. 
Barba, 103 Cal.App.2d 395, 396 [229 P.2d 465]), except as 
provided in Civil Code seetion 157. That section provides that 
in divorce proceedings" the eourt may make orders for tem-
porary exelusion of either party from the family dwelling or 
from the dwelling of the other, until the final detl.'rmination 
of the action." (Sec also Code Civ. Proc., § 949a.) [9] The 
purpose of this section is to protect the spouse's right to the 
exclusive occupancy of his or her or the family dwelling pend-
ing final determination of the action. [10] The trial court 
therefore erred in awarding plaintiff not simply the exclusive 
right to oceupy the dwelling but also the exclusive right to use 
it in any way she might see fit. Moreover, its order was not 
limited in time to the final determination of the action. 
Child Support Award 
[11] There is no merit in defendant's contention that he 
does not have the ability to pay the child support award of 
$75 per month for eaeh child. His total income from 1954 
through 1959 averaged approximately $300 per month after 
the payment of federal income taxes, and he owns assets of 
substantial value. 
The Injunction 
Defendant attacks the injunction that restrains him from 
molesting, anhoying, or striking plaintiff. The word "strik-
ing," as conceded by plaintiff, must be deleted from the order 
because there is no evidence that defendant struck or threat-
ened to strike plaintiff. (De Havila1ld v. Warner Bros. Pic-
fures, Inc., 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 238 [153 P.2d 983] ; PeopZe v. 
Robin, 56 Ca1.App.2d 885, 887 [133 P.2d 436].) 
[12a] There is no merit in defendant's contention that 
the words" molesting" and "an Boying" are so vague and un-
) 
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certain as to rendcr the injunction voiu.(See People v. Moore, 
137 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [290 P.2d 40] ; PMple v. Pallares, 112 
Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901 [246 P.2d 173].) [13] The lan-
guage of the injunction must be interpreted in the light of the 
record {City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 509,514 
(241 P.2d 243] ; Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200 
P .2d 790] ) which discloses the kind of conduct enjoined. (Com-
pare Gottlieb v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.App.2d 309, 312 [335 
P.2d 714].) [12b] On several occasions defendant made 
unfounded accusations that plaintiff had committed adultery 
and used abusive language in her presence; he twice parked 
his truck within sight of the family home and a strange man 
came from the truck to the front door of the house and asked 
plaintiff if a "sporting girl" was there; and he sometimes 
locked plaintiff out of the house late at night so that once she 
was required to have a policeman help her gain entry. 
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it awards alimony and 
child support, adjudges that the family residence is held in 
joint tenancy, adjudges that the savings and loan account was 
held in joint tenancy, and enjoins defendant from molesting 
or annoying plaintiff. In all other respects the parts of the 
judgment appealed from are reversed. Defendant shall bear 
the costs of these appeals. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Tobriner, J., concurred. 
